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ABSTRACT
Recent research documents that while men are eager to compete, women often shy away from competitive
environments. A consequence is that few women enter and win competitions. Using experimental
methods we examine how affirmative action affects competitive entry. We find that when women
are guaranteed equal representation among winners, more women and fewer men enter competitions,
and the response exceeds that predicted by changes in the probability of winning. An explanation for
this response is that under affirmative action the probability of winning depends not only on one's
rank relative to other group members, but also on one's rank within gender. Both beliefs on rank and
attitudes towards competition change when moving to a more gender-specific competition. The changes
in competitive entry have important implications when assessing the costs of affirmative action. Based
on ex-ante tournament entry affirmative action is predicted to lower the performance requirement for
women and thus result in reverse discrimination towards men. Interestingly this need not be the outcome
when competitive entry is not payoff maximizing. The response in entry implies that it may not be
necessary to lower the performance requirement for women to achieve a more diverse set of winners.
Muriel Niederle
Department of Economics
579 Serra Mall
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
and NBER
niederle@stanford.edu
Carmit Segal
Department of Economics and Business
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Jaume I building
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
carmit.segal@upf.edu
Lise Vesterlund
Department of Economics
University of Pittsburgh
4916 W.W. Posvar Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
vester@pitt.edu  1
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite decades of striving for gender equality, large differences still remain between men and 
women in the labor market. Perhaps most noteworthy is the gender segregation across different 
types of jobs. While there is substantial horizontal segregation, with women more likely to 
hold clerical or nurturing jobs and men more visible in manufacturing, the vertical segregation 
within a sector is particularly striking (Weeden, 2004, and Grusky and England, 2004, Ander, 
1998). Across fields men are disproportionately allocated to professional and managerial 
occupations. In a large sample of US firms Bertrand and Hallock (2001) show that women only 
account for 2.5 percent of the five highest paid executives.
1  While it may be argued that such 
segregation is a result of past history, and that these differences will diminish over time, it is 
noteworthy that women are underrepresented among the people who have the minimum 
training frequently required for senior management. Only 30 percent of students at top tier 
business schools are women, and, relative to their male counterparts, female MBA’s are more 
likely to work in the non-profit sector, work part time, or entirely drop out of the work force.
2 
It is commonly argued that discrimination, preference differences for child rearing, and 
ability differences can explain the absence of women in upper level management.
3 Recent 
research suggests that an additional explanation is that women are more reluctant to put 
themselves in a position where they have to compete against others (see e.g., Gneezy and 
Rustichini, 2005, Gupta, Poulsen and Villeval, 2005, and Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, 
henceforth NV).
4 For example, NV examines compensation choices in an environment where 
men and women are equally good at competing. They find that the majority of men select the 
competitive tournament whereas the majority of women select the non-competitive piece rate. 
While low ability men are found to compete too much, high ability women compete too little, 
and few women succeed in and win the tournament. 
From the firm’s perspective it is particularly costly if the upper tail of the performance 
distribution does not enter competitions for jobs or promotions. As explained by B. Joseph 
White, president of University of Illinois, “Getting more women into MBA programs means 
                                                 
1 Similarly only about 17 percent of the partners at major law firms nationwide were women in 2005 (Timothy 
O’Brien, The New York Times, March 19, 2006). 
2 E.g., Hewlett and Luce, 2005.  See also Blau and Kahn, 2004. 
3 See Altonji and Blank (1999), Black and Strahan (2001), and Goldin and Rouse (2000). 
4 The Babcock and Laschever (2003) finding that women are more reluctant to negotiate may also be seen as 
evidence of gender differences in willingness to compete.   2
better access to the total talent pool for business”.
5 An additional argument for increasing the 
number of women in top managerial positions is that diversity in and of itself may benefit the 
firm.
6 Indeed US corporations are concerned by their inability to attain and recruit women, and 
they are increasingly developing programs to improve the number of women employees.
7  
When instituting programs to alter the gender composition in certain jobs it is of course 
important that we understand how these programs influence behavior. To begin this process, 
we use experiments to investigate how affirmative action may affect participants’ willingness 
to compete. Specifically, we consider a quota system which requires that out of two winners of 
a tournament at least one must be a woman.
8 We examine the consequences such a system may 
have on the individual’s decision to compete and thereby on the resulting gender composition 
of the applicant pool. Accounting for this response we ask how costly it is to secure that 
women be equally represented among those who win competitions. In particular, how much 
lower will the performance threshold be for women? How many better performing men will 
have to be passed by to hire a woman? To what extent will reverse discrimination arise? These 
questions are particularly interesting in light of the non-payoff maximizing tournament-entry 
decisions documented by NV. 
We find that the introduction of affirmative action results in substantial changes in 
tournament entry. While the entry of women increases, that of men decreases, and the response 
exceeds that predicted by changes in the probability of winning. We attribute the excessive 
response in the gender gap to three different factors. One is that the mere mention of 
affirmative action increases women’s willingness to compete. The other two factors both relate 
to the fact that affirmative action makes the competition more gender specific. The requirement 
that at least one of two winners must be a woman implies that a woman will win the 
tournament if she is either the best performing woman in her group or among the top two 
performers in the group overall. In contrast a man will win the tournament if he is both the top 
performing man in his group and among the two best performers in the group overall. There 
appears to be two reasons why a more gender-specific competition affects behavior: first, 
participants hold different beliefs on relative performance within versus across gender, and 
                                                 
5 The University Record, May 22, 2000, http://www.ur.umich.edu/9900/May22_00/8.htm. 
6 See e.g., Page, 2007. 
7 For example, corporations such as Ernst and Young, Goldman Sachs, IBM, and PricewaterhouseCoopers have 
all adopted substantial female retention and attraction programs (see e.g., The Economist, July 21, 2005). 
8 Affirmative action programs in the US have historically been of two forms: preferential treatment and quota.   3
second, participants seem to view competition as either less intimidating or enjoyable when 
competing against groups where the opposite gender is more poorly represented.
9  
The substantial tournament-entry response to affirmative action has important 
implications when assessing the sacrifice in performance required to secure a more diverse 
group of winners. The costs of affirmative action depend on how much lower the minimum 
performance threshold will have to be to secure gender parity, compared to that found for a 
group in which gender is not taken into account. Ignoring the change in entry, it is anticipated 
that equal representation of women will result in a decrease in the minimum performance 
requirement for women and that many better performing men will be passed by. The change in 
tournament entry implies that women become better represented among the set of entrants, and 
in particular that more high performing women are in the applicant pool. Thus it becomes 
much less costly to achieve equal representation and the resulting minimum performance 
threshold is unchanged under affirmative action. We therefore find that when women shy away 
from competition and don’t enter when it is payoff maximizing to do so, it need not be costly 
to use affirmative action to achieve a more diverse set of winners.  
In the next section we discuss why affirmative action may alter the tournament-entry 
decisions of men and women. We then describe our experimental design which builds on that 
of NV and discuss how it helps us investigate the potential effects of affirmative action. We 
introduce our analysis by first showing that our basic results replicate those of NV. We then 
proceed by determining the extent to which we can account for the changes in tournament 
entry under affirmative action. Finally we conclude by examining how changes in tournament 
entry mitigate the costs anticipated from affirmative action. 
 
II. POTENTIAL EFFECT OF AA ON GENDER GAP IN TOURNAMENT ENTRY 
NV finds that the gender gap in tournament entry in part can be explained by men being more 
overconfident than women, and by men and women having different attitudes towards 
competitions. The central question in this paper is whether and how an institution such as 
affirmative action affects the gender gap in tournament entry. We consider a quota system 
where at least one of two winners must be a woman. There are several factors that may result 
                                                 
9 This argument is similar to that given for the benefits of single sex education for girls: it may be easier for girls 
to compete when competing against only girls (See Solnick, 1995, and Harwarth, Maline, and DeBra, 1997). See 
also Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) for performance in single versus mixed sex competitions.   4
in tournament entry changing with this system. We will discuss the most obvious ones and 
explain how our experiment is designed to account for them. 
 
Factor 1. Change in the probability of winning: The direct effect of affirmative action is that it 
distorts the probability of winning the tournament in favor of women and against men. To the 
extent that participants respond to changes in incentives, tournament entry is expected to 
increase for women and decrease for men. To control for this effect we condition on the 
probability of winning.  
 
Factor 2. Within-gender beliefs: The NV study documented a significant gender difference in 
overconfidence and showed that this difference helps explain the gender gap in tournament 
entry. A consequence of affirmative action is that the tournament-entry decision does not only 
depend on the individual’s perception of rank within the whole group, but also on the 
perception of rank within their gender. Specifically, a woman should enter either if she thinks 
she is the best performing woman or among the top two performers overall. In contrast a man 
should enter if he thinks he is both the best performing man and among the top two performers 
overall. If participants hold different beliefs on relative performance within versus across 
gender then this may cause the gender gap in tournament entry to change under affirmative 
action. We elicit the participant’s within-gender beliefs to determine if they differ across 
gender and how they may affect tournament entry. 
 
Factor 3. Affirmative action context effect: Another reason why participants may respond 
differently to the affirmative-action tournament is that the mere mention of affirmative action 
may discourage men and encourage women to select the competitive compensation. To control 
for this possibility we examine compensation choices under the affirmative action rule when 
these choices do not require a future competitive performance. 
 
Factor 4. Competing against own gender: Finally a factor that may influence the decision to 
enter and actively compete in an affirmative-action tournament is that the competition becomes 
more gender specific. For women the competition is no longer simply a competition against all 
other members of the group, but rather a competition against the other women in the group. If   5
women do not generally shy away from competitions, but rather shy away from competing in 
mixed-gender groups, then their behavior may be quite different under affirmative action.
10 
Changes may also be seen for men as affirmative action implies that it is no longer sufficient to 
be among the top two performers overall, rather a man also needs to be the best performing 
man. Having controlled for Factors 1 through 3, we will ascribe any unexplained response to 
affirmative action as evidence that Factor 4 influences behavior.
11 
 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The experiment was conducted at the Harvard Business School, using students from the CLER 
subject pool. Our design builds on that of NV. One to three groups of 6 participants, three 
women and three men, participated in each session. The gender composition of the group was 
made clear to participants as they were seated in the laboratory, and they were shown who the 
other 5 members of their group were. A total of 14 groups participated in the experiment for a 
total of 42 men and 42 women.
12  
Participants were asked to perform a real task under varying compensation schemes. 
The task was to add up sets of five 2-digit numbers. Participants were not allowed to use a 
calculator, but could use scratch paper. The numbers were randomly drawn and each problem 
was presented in the following way:  
21 35 48 29 83  
 
For each problem participants were asked to fill in the sum in the blank box. Once the 
participant submitted an answer on the computer, a new problem appeared jointly with 
information on whether the former answer was correct.
13 A record of the number of correct and 
incorrect answers was kept on the screen. Participants had 5 minutes to solve as many 
problems as they could. A stop watch was shown at the front of the room via a projector and a 
buzzer would go off at the end of the 5 minutes. The participant’s final score was determined 
                                                 
10 Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) find that women are as good as men at competing in single-sex but not 
in mixed-sex tournaments. Such differences are often emphasized by advocates of single-sex schooling. It may be 
that girls do not dislike competition per se, but rather that they dislike competing against boys. Thus girls in all-
girl schools may be more competitive (see Harwarth, Maline and DeBra 1997 for an overview).  
11 This captures the possibility that men and women are more comfortable competing against women than men. 
12 In one session (two groups) the stop watch malfunctioned for the fourth task. This session is excluded from our 
analysis. The behavior and performance prior to the fourth task resemble those of the other sessions.  
13 The program was written using the software zTree (Fischbacher 2007).   6
by the number of correctly solved problems. An attractive feature of this 5-minute addition 
task is that it requires both skill and effort.  
Participants were told that they had to complete six tasks of which one was randomly 
chosen for payment at the end of the experiment. By paying only for one task, we diminish the 
chance that decisions in a given task may be used to hedge against outcomes in other tasks. In 
addition to their payment for performance each participant also received a $10 show-up fee, 
and an additional $5 for completing the experiment. Participants were informed of the nature 
of a task only immediately before performing the task. While participants knew their absolute 
performance on a task, i.e., how many problems they solved correctly, they were not informed 
of their relative performance until the end of the experiment. The specific compensations and 
order of tasks were as follows.
14 
 
Task 1 – Piece Rate: Participants are given the 5-minute addition task and receive 50 cents per 
correct answer.  
 
Task 2 – Tournament: Participants are given the 5-minute addition task. The two participants 
who provide the largest number of correct answers in the group each receive $1.50 per correct 
answer. The other participants receive no payment.  
 
In the next task participants also perform the five-minute addition task, but this time they select 
which of the two compensation schemes they want to apply to their future performance, piece 
rate or tournament. A participant with a given performance has higher expected earnings in the 
tournament when the probability of winning exceeds 33 percent.
15 There are two reasons for 
presenting participants with the compensations prior to their choice, first it provides them with 
experience of both, and second it provides us with performance measures which enable us to 
determine whether men and women of equal performance make similar compensation choices.
  
Task 3 – Choice: Before performing the 5-minute addition task, participants select whether 
they want to be paid according to a piece rate, i.e., 50 cents per correct answer, or a 
                                                 
14 In the event that there are ties in a competitive task the winner was chosen randomly among the high scorers. 
15 By paying the tournament winner per correct problem we avoid the issue of choosing a high enough fixed prize 
to ensure that even high-performing participants benefit from tournament entry.   7
tournament. A participant who selects the tournament wins the tournament and receives $1.50 
per correct answer if the participant’s task-3 score exceeds that of at least 4 of the other group 
members in task 2, otherwise the participant receives no payment.  
 
  Winners of the task-3 tournament are determined by comparing their task-3 
performance to the task-2 performance of the other group members, rather than others’ task-3 
performance. Thus, participants compete against the past performances of others.
16 As 
emphasized by NV this has several advantages; first, participants are competing against 
competitive performances of others; second, the tournament-entry decision only depends on 
beliefs about ones relative performance, and not on the expected tournament-entry decisions of 
others;
17 and third, a participant’s choice does not impose any externalities on others.
18 
Effectively the task-3 decision is an individual-decision problem.    
  Next we examine entry into an affirmative-action tournament. We refer to this as an 
AA tournament. In the AA tournament at least one of the winners will be a woman. Having 
mentioned the group’s gender composition at the experiment’s beginning, we hope to isolate 
the effect of affirmative action. 
 
Task 4 – Affirmative-Action Choice: Before performing the 5-minute addition task, 
participants select whether they want to be paid according to a piece rate, i.e., 50 cents per 
correct answer, or an AA tournament. A participant who selects the AA tournament receives 
$1.50 per correct answer when winning the tournament, and $0 otherwise. The two winners are 
the highest performing woman and the highest performer of the remaining 5 participants. Thus, 
a woman wins the AA tournament if her task-4 performance either  exceeds the task-2 
performance of the two other women in the group or exceeds that of at least four other group 
members. A man wins the AA tournament if his task-4 performance both exceeds the task-2 
performance of the two other men in the group and exceeds that of at least four other group 
members. 
                                                 
16 Many sports competitions are not performed simultaneously, e.g., downhill skiing. 
17 This secures that the gender composition and size of the competitive group is held constant across participants.  
18 Note that our design allows for the possibility that participants who enter the tournament all lose or all win. The 
absence of externalities helps us rule out that women avoid the competition to not decrease the chance that others 
win. For a discussion of possible gender differences in altruism see e.g., Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), Eckel 
and Grossman (2002b), Croson and Gneezy (2004).   8
As argued by NV there are several reasons why men and women may differ in their 
willingness to enter a competition. One explanation is that preferences for performing in a 
competitive environment may differ across gender.
19 Other more general explanations are that 
women may have lower expectations about their relative ability, be more averse to risk, or 
more reluctant to be in an environment where they receive feedback on their relative 
performance.
20 What distinguishes gender differences in preferences for competing from the 
more general differences, is that the former relies critically on the tournament-entry decision 
resulting in a subsequent competitive performance. The other explanations are more general, 
and should be present in other decisions as well. To jointly control for the role played by these 
three general factors we present participants with two additional environments which mimic 
the tournament-entry decisions in Task 3 and 4, without involving an actual competitive 
performance. Specifically we first ask participants to choose between a competitive and a non-
competitive compensation scheme for their past non-competitive task-1 piece-rate 
performance, thus a choice of tournament does not require participants to subsequently 
perform in a competition. As the potential thrill, anxiety or fear of performing in a competition 
is absent from this choice, this decision will control for the effect general factors, such as 
overconfidence, risk and feedback aversion, have on the compensation choice. Participants are 
reminded of their task-1 piece-rate performance prior to their compensation choice.  
 
Task 5 – Submit Piece Rate to a Tournament: Participants do not have to perform in this 
task. They choose which compensation they want to apply to their past piece-rate performance: 
a 50-cent piece rate per correct answer or a tournament. A participant who enters the 
tournament receives $1.50 per correct answer if the participant’s task-1 piece-rate performance 
is among the two highest scores in the group, otherwise no payment is received.  
                                                 
19 While the prospect of engaging in a competition may cause women to anticipate a psychic cost and deter them 
from tournaments, men may anticipate a psychic benefit and be drawn to them. Nurture as well as nature may 
cause women to be more reluctant to perform in a competition, see e.g., Daly and Wilson (1983), Campbell 
(2002), Ruble, Martin, and Berenbaum (2006), Gneezy, Leonard and List (2006).  
20 While individuals are found to be overconfident, men tend to be more overconfident than women (e.g., 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips, 1982, Beyer, 1990, Beyer and Bowden, 1997, and Niederle and Vesterlund, 
2007). Thus men may be more likely to enter tournaments. Another dimension in which men and women are 
found to differ is in their attitudes towards risk (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 2002a, Croson and Gneezy, 2004, 
Byrnes, Miller and Shafer, 1999). As tournaments involve uncertain payoffs attitudes towards risk are expected to 
affect compensation choices. Finally, men and women have been found to respond differently to feedback on 
relative performance (see e.g., Roberts and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1989, Dweck 2000). Since entering the tournament 
results in learning whether one won or lost the tournament feedback aversion may also influence entry.   9
  Finally, for participants’ last task they are asked to make a similar decision in an AA 
tournament, that is, they decide whether they want to submit their piece-rate performance to an 
AA tournament. This decision serves as a control for general factors in the affirmative-action 
decision including the possibility that merely mentioning affirmative action results in an 
excessive response in behavior. 
 
Task 6 – Submit Piece Rate to AA Tournament: Participants do not have to perform in this 
task. They choose which compensation scheme they want to apply to their past piece-rate 
performance: a 50-cent piece rate per correct answer or an AA tournament. A participant who 
selected the tournament receives $1.50 per correct answer when winning the tournament, and 
$0 otherwise. The two winners are the highest performing woman and the highest performer of 
the remaining 5 participants. 
  
As in tasks 3 and 4 a participant’s decision does not affect the earnings of any other participant, 
nor does it depend on the entry decisions of others. Thus tasks 5 and 6 are also individual-
decision tasks. 
Finally, at the end of the experiment participants were asked to guess their rank in the 
task-1 piece rate and task-2 tournament both within the whole group of 6 participants and 
within their own gender. Each participant picked a rank between 1 and 6 and between 1 and 3, 
respectively, and was paid $1 for each correct guess.
21 This allows us to determine if beliefs on 
relative performance differ in single versus mixed gender groups, and whether such differences 
affect tournament entry.  
We can use Task 1, 2, 3 and 5 and across gender beliefs to determine whether we 
replicate the NV findings. By comparing choices in task 3 and 4, we can then move on to 
examine the effect of affirmative action on the gender gap in tournament entry. Of particular 
interest is the extent to which such changes are caused by the affirmative-action competition 
being more gender specific (Factor 4), or if it is accounted for by factors that are not associated 
with the active competition. Such non-competitive factors involve changes in the probability of 
winning (Factor 1), the fact that under affirmative action the probability of winning depends 
                                                 
21 In the event of ties in actual rank we counted every answer that could be correct as correct. For example, if the 
performance in the group was 10, 10, 11, 12, 13, 13 then an answer of sixth and fifth was correct for a score of 10, 
and an answer of first and second was correct for a score of 13.    10
both on across-gender beliefs and on within-gender beliefs (Factor 2), and that the mere 
mention of affirmative action may result in an exaggerated response to affirmative action 
(Factor 3). Performance in task 1 and 2 will help us control for changes in the probability of 
winning (i.e., Factor 1), within-gender beliefs serve as a test of Factor 2, and we can use 
choices in tasks 5 and 6 as a control for Factor 3.  
 
IV. GENDER DIFFERENCES IN COMPENSATION CHOICES 
We start by characterizing the tournament-entry decisions prior to the introduction of 
affirmative action, to determine whether we replicate the findings of NV. Although the 
experimental designs are similar there are several dimensions in which the two studies differ. 
First, participants in this experiment were made aware that groups were gender balanced; this 
may have altered behavior if it led participants to expect that gender was a variable of 
interest.
22 Second, we examine groups of 6 individuals with 2 winners, rather than groups of 
four with one winner. Third, our return from winning is $1.5 per problem, rather than $2 per 
problem as in NV. Fourth, we use students from the Harvard Business School CLER lab 
subject pool, rather than the PEEL subject pool at the University of Pittsburgh. Finally, show-
up and completion fees were altered to follow common practice at CLER.
23 Each or all of these 
factors have the potential of influencing behavior. We first describe entry decisions in the 
present study, and then show that despite differences we replicate the main results of NV. 
 
IV.A. Piece Rate and Tournament: Performance and Choice 
In both the piece rate and tournament we find significant gender differences in performance. 
The average number of correctly solved problems in the piece rate is 10.3 for women and 12.9 
for men, and in the tournament it is 12.3 for women and 14.8 for men. Two-sided Mann-
Whitney tests show that both of these differences are significant (p = 0.03 and p = 0.06, 
respectively).
24 To assess the probability of winning the tournament we randomly create six-
                                                 
22 For example, women may experience “stereotype threat” if they believe there is a stereotype against them 
performing well in competition against men. This source of anxiety (conform to the stereotype and fail to compete 
successfully) may lead to higher instances of “choking under pressure” when performing a task (Steele 1997). 
23 Participants in Pittsburgh were given $5 show-up fee and $7 for completing the tasks. 
24 While the piece rate and tournament performances are highly correlated (spearman rank correlations of 0.62 for 
women and 0.79 for men), participants perform better under the tournament than the piece-rate (matched pair sign 
rank tests yield p < 0.01 for each gender separately). The average increase however does not differ by gender (a   11
person groups from the observed performance distributions and determine the 2 winners. 
Conditioning only on gender, the probability of winning is 43.2 percent for a man and 23.5 
percent for a woman.
25 Table I shows that conditional on performance the probability of 
winning however is similar for women and men.
26  
 
TABLE I 
PROBABILITY OF WINNING TASK-2 TOURNAMENT CONDITIONAL ON TASK-2 PERFORMANCE  
  8  9  10  11  12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 21 22 25 28 29 35
Women 0 0.1 0.6 2.5  8.6  21.8 40.7 58.1 71.4 80.2 87.1 92.2 --  96.2  --  --  --  -- 
Men  0 0.1 0.7 2.8 11.0 28.2 48.7 65.8 77.8 85.6 91.1 --  96.6 98.1 99.2 99.6 99.9 100
 
Having experienced both the 50-cent piece rate and $1.50 tournament, participants are 
asked which of the two compensation schemes they want to apply to their task-3 performance. 
The tournament results in higher expected earnings when the probability of winning exceeds 
33 percent. As seen in Table I this corresponds to participants who solve 14 or more problems. 
If a participant’s performance in task 3 is exactly as in task 2, then 28.6 percent of the women 
and 50 percent of the men have higher expected earnings in the tournament. This predicted 
gender gap is significant (a two-sided Fisher’s exact test yields p = 0.07). Unless otherwise 
noted the reported test statistics henceforth refer to a two-sided Fisher’s exact test 
The actual gender gap in tournament entry is even greater than predicted: 31 percent of 
women and 73.8 percent of men select the tournament. This gender gap is significant (p < 
0.01) and greater than expected (p = 0.04). While men enter significantly more than predicted 
by their task-2 performance (p = 0.042), women do not (p = 1.0). 
To compare entry decisions of women and men, we condition their choices on their 
probability of winning the tournament.
27 We regress the compensation choice on the 
probability of winning the task-2 tournament and on the change in the probability of winning a 
                                                                                                                                                          
two-sided Mann-Whitney test yields p = 0.73). This improvement in performance may be caused by learning or 
by the performance incentives in the tournament. Two results suggest that learning may play a prominent role. 
First, NV shows that tournament entry does not influence the participant’s subsequent performance. Second, 
DellaVigna, Malmendier and Vesterlund (in progress) have participants perform six rounds of 3-minute 
tournaments, and find a significant increase in performance from round 1 to 2, but not in subsequent rounds. 
25 Of the 14 task-2 tournaments with 2 winners each, 20 were won by men and 11 by women (three cases of ties). 
26 For any given performance level, say 15 for a woman, we draw 1,000,000 groups consisting of 3 men and 2 
women, using the performance distribution of the 42 men and 42 women with replacement. We then calculate the 
woman’s frequency of wins in this set of simulated groups.  
27 Prior to the affirmative action analysis it is largely inconsequential to condition on the probability of winning 
rather than actual performance, however this distinction is important when we study the AA tournament where the 
probability of winning conditional on performance differs by gender.   12
task-2 tournament when using the task-2 performance versus the task-1 performance.
28 Table II 
shows that while the probability of winning does not influence the likelihood of tournament-
entry for women, it does increase it for men. Pooling men and women and conditioning on the 
probability of winning, we find a significant gender gap of 36 percentage points. That is a man 
with a 33 percent chance of winning the tournament, and a 16 percentage point increase in the 
probability of winning with the tournament rather than the piece rate performance, would have 
a 36 percentage point lower chance of entering the tournament if he were a woman.
29 
 
TABLE II 
PROBIT OF TOURNAMENT CHOICE 
 Task-2  Performance 
 Men  Women  All 
Female     -0.36 
   (0.00) 
Probability of Winning  1.37  0.39  0.79 
 (0.02)  (0.26)  (0.00) 
Change in Prob. of   -0.62  -0.06  -0.29 
Winning Tour. to PR   (0.21)  (0.88)  (0.27) 
Observations 42  42  84 
Dependent variable: task-3 compensation choice (1-tournament and 0-piece rate). The table presents marginal 
effects evaluated at an individual (a man in the last column) with a 33 percent chance of winning the tournament 
and a change of 0.16 in the probability of winning when using the piece-rate performance in the tournament. p-
values are in parenthesis. 
 
        A possible explanation for the gender difference in the decision to enter the tournament 
is that participants correctly anticipate a change in performance following their task-3 choice. 
However, a probit regression using performance in task 3 yields similar results.
30  
The gender gap in tournament entry is greatest among those with high performance. Of 
those who for a given task-2 performance have higher expected earnings in the tournament 
than piece rate, i.e., those solving 14 or more problems, we find a significant (p < 0.01) gender 
                                                 
28 The change in the probability of winning the tournament when using the task-2 rather than task-1 performance 
is given by pT(Task 2)- pT(Task 1), where pT(x) denotes the probability of winning the tournament with a 
performance of x (note pT(x) may differ by gender).  
29 The marginal effect is evaluated at the point where a participant is indifferent towards entering the tournament, 
i.e., the probability of winning is 33 percent. This corresponds to having a performance between 13 and 14. For 
these participants pT(Task 2)- pT(Task 1) = 0.16 on average, thus we assess the marginal effect at this point.  
30 When using task-3 performance to determine the probability of winning we find a 41 percentage point (p < 
0.01) gender gap in tournament entry. The task-3 performance is highly correlated with that in task-2 (spearman 
rank correlations are 0.78 for women and 0.77 for men). The average increase in performance from task 2 is 0.5 
for women, and this increase is not significant (matched pair signrank test yields p = 0.32, t-test p = 0.17). The 
improvement of 0.69 for men is significant (matched pair signrank test p = 0.06, t-test p = 0.07). The gender 
difference in the improvement is not significant (p = 0.35).   13
difference in entry, with 100 percent of the men and 33.3 percent of the women entering. In 
contrast the gender gap is not significant (p=0.25) among participants who based on the task-2 
performance have lower expected earnings in the tournament. For this group 47.6 percent of 
the men and 30 percent of the women enter.
31 From a payoff-maximizing perspective too few 
high-performing women enter the tournament. 
 
IV.B. Explanations for the Gender Gap in Tournament Entry 
What factors can account for the gender differences in tournament entry? As in NV we 
examine whether men are more overconfident than women and whether this explains why 
fewer women enter the tournament. Combined with beliefs we then use the decision to submit 
the piece-rate performance to a tournament (task 5) to distinguish between the role played by 
gender differences in preferences for performing in a competition, and the more general 
explanations such as gender differences in overconfidence, risk and feedback aversion. 
We first determine whether men and women of equal performance have different 
beliefs about their relative task-2 tournament performance.
32 As men outperform women we 
cannot directly compare beliefs across gender. Instead we compare beliefs conditional on the 
participant’s optimal guessed rank. A participant’s optimal guessed rank is the rank that 
conditional on gender and performance would maximize earnings from guessing.
33 Not 
surprisingly the optimal guessed ranks of women and men are significantly different (two-
sided Mann-Whitney p = 0.05). Ordered probit regressions show that women and men with a 
higher performance and thereby a higher optimal guessed rank believe they have a higher 
rank.
34 This result is illustrated by Figure 1 which shows the participants’ guessed rank 
conditional on the optimal guessed rank. While men are overconfident, women are not.
35 
Controlling for optimal guessed rank, men are more optimistic about their relative performance 
                                                 
31 The results are practically identical when using task-3 performance. 
32 Recall we paid participants $1 to correctly guess how their performance ranked relative to the other members of 
their group. A strong positive correlation between elicited ranks and tournament entry (Table III) suggests that 
hedging against the tournament-entry decision was not a dominant motive when reporting beliefs. 
33For a given performance level, say 15 for a woman, we draw 1,000,000 groups consisting of 3 men and 2 
women, sampling with replacement from the performance distribution of the 42 men and 42 women. We then 
determine the woman’s rank in each of these groups and the optimal guessed rank is the mode of these ranks. 
34 An ordered probit regression of guessed tournament rank on optimal guessed rank yields a coefficient of 0.42 
for men and 0.34 for women, each with p < 0.01. 
35 For men, testing if the distribution of guessed ranks is independent of that of actual ranks yields p = 0.09, and 
comparing the distribution of guessed rank to optimal ranks yields p = 0.04. For women, the comparisons of 
guessed ranks to actual ranks yields p = 0.51 and to optimal guessed ranks yields p = 0.37.   14
than women. An ordered probit regression of the guessed tournament rank yields coefficients 
of 0.39 on the optimal guessed rank (p < 0.01) and 0.66 on a female dummy (p = 0.01).  
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FIGURE I: The mean guessed rank for each optimal guessed rank  
 
A method for summarizing beliefs which will prove helpful in our affirmative action 
analysis is to consider whether the participant’s guessed rank is consistent with the belief that 
he or she will win the tournament, we refer to this measure as GuessWin.
36 The results on 
beliefs are very similar when we use this binary belief measure, and the correspondingly 
constructed optimal guessed-win measure. Those who are most likely to win are also more 
likely to report beliefs consistent with winning, and conditional on optimal guessed win, men 
are significantly more likely than women to believe that they will win.
37 While men are 
overconfident, women are not.
38  
Next we examine the extent to which the overconfidence of men can explain why 
conditional on performance men enter the tournament more frequently than women. Although 
entry decisions are positively correlated with the participants’ beliefs on winning the 
tournament, there are still substantial gender differences.
39 Looking at the 54 percent of 
                                                 
36 While the AA tournament entry decision conditional on GuessWin is predicted to be the same for men and 
women that is not the case when conditioning on guessed rank. 
37 A probit regression of the guess of winning the tournament yields marginal coefficients of -0.3 on female (p = 
0.01), and 0.45 on optimal guess of winning (p < 0.01), evaluated at a man whose optimal guess is winning. 
38For men, testing if the distribution of GuessWin is independent of actual win yields p = 0.05, and a comparison 
of GuessWin to OptimalGuessWin yields p = 0.07. For women, the comparison of GuessWin to actual win yields 
p = 0.64 and to optimal win p = 0.48. For women, the marginal coefficient of a probit regression of the guess on 
winning the tournament on OptimalGuessWin yields a coefficient of 0.32 (p = 0.06) on someone whose optimal 
guess is to win. For men the coefficient is 0.48 (p < 0.01).  
39 A probit regression of the propensity to enter the tournament as a function of the guess of winning the task-2 
tournament yields, for men: 0.45 (p < 0.01), and for women 0.45 (p < 0.01).   15
participants’ who have beliefs consistent with winning the task-2 tournament, 87 percent of 
men enter the tournament, compared to 60 percent of women. Among the remaining 
participants whose beliefs are consistent with loosing the task-2 tournament, 42 percent of men 
enter the tournament, compared to 15 percent of women. While the gender gap is around 27 
percentage points in both cases, the difference is only significant among those who believe that 
they will win ( p = 0.06 and p = 0.10, respectively). 
The probit regression  of Table III shows tournament entry as a function of both 
absolute and believed performance. When only controlling for performance the gender gap was 
36 percentage points (Column 1). This gap reduces to 25 percentage points when we control 
for the participants’ imputed beliefs on winning the tournament.
40 Although the overconfidence 
by men helps account for the gender difference in tournament entry a substantial portion of the 
gap remains unexplained. 
TABLE III 
PROBIT OF TOURNAMENT-ENTRY DECISION (TASK 3): 
  (1) (2)   
Female -0.36  -0.25 
 (0.00)  (0.03) 
Probability of Winning  0.79  0.45 
 (0.00)  (0.02) 
Change in Prob. of Winning Tour. to PR  -0.29  -0.31 
 (0.27)  (0.15) 
GuessWin    0.35 
    (0.01) 
Observations 84  84 
Dependent variable: task-3 compensation choice (1-tournament and 0-piece rate). The table presents marginal 
effects evaluated at a man with a 33 percent chance of winning the tournament, and  a 0.16 change in the 
probability of winning from a piece-rate to a tournament, who thinks that he would win the tournament (i.e., ranks 
either first or second in his group of six) in column 2. p-values are in parenthesis. 
 
To account for the unexplained gap in tournament entry we use the elicited beliefs and 
task-5 compensation choice to simultaneously control for the role played by gender differences 
in general factors such as overconfidence, risk and feedback aversion. In task 5 participants 
choose between a competitive and a non-competitive compensation scheme for their past task-
1 piece-rate performance. This decision is similar to the decision to enter a tournament and 
perform in a competition (task 3). The difference between the two is that only in task 3 do they 
subsequently have to compete. Thus while overconfidence, risk and feedback aversion can 
                                                 
40 When we use belief on rank instead of GuessWin, the marginal coefficient on female in the probit regression is 
reduced to -0.18 (p = 0.04).    16
influence the compensation choices in task 3 and 5, only in task 3 can differences in 
preferences for performing in a competition play a role.
41 
Controlling both for the task-5 decision and the elicited beliefs we determine if the act 
of performing in a competition creates a gap in tournament entry that cannot be explained by 
these general factors. As seen in Table IV the effect of controlling for the task-5 decision is 
substantial. While adding beliefs reduced the gender gap in tournament entry from 36 to 25 
percentage points (Columns 1 and 2), the gender gap is further reduced to 17 percentage points 
when controlling for the decision to submit the piece rate (Column 3). This decrease may be 
explained both by the control for risk and feedback aversion, and by the fact that the decision 
to submit the piece rate serves as an additional measure of the individual’s general degree of 
confidence. It is therefore not surprising to see that the coefficient on GuessWin decreases as 
we move from Column 2 to Column 3.
42 Despite the explanatory power of these variables a 
substantial gender gap in tournament entry remains. The remaining gap suggests that the 
decision to enter the tournament is explained in part by women being relatively more averse to 
choices that require a future performance in a competitive environment. 
 
TABLE IV 
PROBIT OF TOURNAMENT-ENTRY DECISION (TASK 3) 
  (1) (2)  (3) 
Female -0.36  -0.25  -0.17 
 (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Prob. Of Winning  0.79  0.45  0.22 
 (0.00)  (0.02)  (0.08) 
Change in Prob. of Winning Tour. to PR  -0.29  -0.31  -0.11 
 (0.27)  (0.15)  (0.45) 
GuessWin    0.35 0.25 
   (0.01)  (0.01) 
Submit the Piece Rate      0.15 
     (0.10) 
Observations 84  84  84 
Dependent variable: task-3 compensation choice (1-tournament and 0-piece rate). The table presents marginal 
effects evaluated at a man with a 33 percent chance of winning, a 0.16 change in probability of winning, who 
submitted his piece rate to the tournament (column 3), and thinks (columns 2 and 3) that he wins the tournament 
(i.e., ranks first or second in his group of six). p -values are in parenthesis. 
 
                                                 
41 An indication of the differences between task 3 and task 5 is that conditional on the probability of winning a 
task-1 tournament there are no gender differences in task-5 decisions.  
42 When we use the belief on rank instead of GuessWin, the marginal coefficient on female is -0.15 (p = 0.04). 
Thus controlling for the task-5 decision only yields a minor reduction in the gender gap in tournament entry.   17
IV.C. Comparison to NV 
Although there are several differences between this study and that of NV, the overall findings 
are nonetheless similar. While NV found no significant gender differences in performance, in 
the present study men on average outperform women by 2.5 problems in both the piece rate 
and the tournament. Interestingly the female performance in the present study is in line with 
that of NV, where on average men and women solve 10.4 problems in the piece rate and 12 
problems in the tournament.
43 The gender differences in tournament entry are, however, 
similar in the two studies. In NV the gender gap in tournament entry is 38 percentage points 
when controlling only for the probability of winning the tournament. Controlling also for the 
participant’s belief on winning the task-2 tournament this gap reduces to 26 percentage points, 
and finally adding the decision to submit the piece rate to a tournament reduces the gap to 14 
percentage points. In comparison the present study finds that the corresponding gender gaps 
are 36, 25, and 17 percentage points.
44 Thus the results of NV are both qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar to those found here. The only difference between the two studies is that 
while NV finds that low-performing men enter the tournament more often than low-performing 
women, this difference is not significant in the present study.
45   
 
V. THE EFFECT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ON ENTRY 
Next we examine the response to the affirmative action requirement that at least one of two 
winners must be a woman. In determining the role played by the factors presented in Section II 
we first account for changes in the probability of winning. We then examine the effect of 
beliefs and pay particular attention to the comparison of within- versus across-gender beliefs. 
To account for the effect of merely mentioning affirmative action, we compare the decisions to 
submit a past piece-rate performance to a standard versus an AA tournament (task 5 vs. 6). 
Finally, using both beliefs and the decision to submit the piece rate we determine whether the 
effect of affirmative action on tournament entry in part can be explained by participants having 
to perform in a more gender-specific competition.  
                                                 
43 Our design does not enable us to determine what causes this gender gap in performance, in particular we can 
not determine if it is caused by participants knowing that gender is a variable of interest. 
44 To conform to the present study we reran the regression in NV including all participants and controlling for the 
probability of winning and participants’ GuessWin. The reported numbers differ slightly from those of NV. 
45 Subsequent experiments at Harvard suggest that this difference is significant in a second sample, and when 
using the larger combined sample (Niederle, Segal, Vesterlund, in preparation).   18
V.A. The Effect of Changes in the Probability of Winning on AA Tournament Entry (Task 4) 
The introduction of affirmative action increases the probability of winning the tournament for 
women while decreasing it for men. If participants in an AA tournament had performances as 
in task 2 then the predicted probabilities of winning would be 36.2 percent for women and 30.4 
percent for men. Conditioning on both gender and individual performance the probabilities of 
winning the AA tournament are as reported in Table V.  
 
TABLE V 
PROBABILITY OF WINNING TASK-4 TOURNAMENT CONDITIONAL ON TASK-2 PERFORMANCE: 
  9  10  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 21 22 25 28 29 35 
Women 1.8 4.9 10.5 25.3 46.9 64.6 77.3 85.7 91.1 94.7 97.3 --  99.3  --  --  --  -- 
Men  0.1 0.4  1.6  5.5  14.2 26.8 39.6 50.6 58.6 66.8 --  75.3 79.6 84.0 88.5 93.0 97.6
 
As noted earlier, anyone with a 33 percent or higher chance of winning the tournament has 
higher expected earnings from the tournament than piece rate. Thus, as seen in Table V, 
women with a performance of 13 or more and men with a performance of 15 or more are in 
expectation better off selecting the AA tournament. Affirmative action therefore decreases the 
performance at which it becomes profitable to enter the tournament by one correct problem for 
women while increasing it by one correct problem for men.
46  
If participants’ task-4 performance is as their task-2 performance, then it is payoff 
maximizing to enter the AA tournament for 40.5 percent of women and 38.1 percent of men. In 
sharp contrast, we observe 83.3 percent of women and 45.2 percent of men entering, while the 
entry by women is greater than predicted that by men is not (p < 0.01 and p = 0.66, 
respectively). The resulting gender gap in entry into the AA tournament is significant (p < 
0.01) and differs from that predicted (p < 0.01).
47 Entry in the AA tournament therefore 
contrasts with that of the standard tournament. While men in the standard tournament enter 
more than predicted and more than women, this result is reversed under affirmative action as 
women enter more than predicted and more than men.  
To assess how changes in the probability of winning affect tournament entry, we 
compare entry decisions under the standard and AA tournament. Figure II panel A shows the 
proportion of men who enter the standard and AA tournament conditional on their probability 
                                                 
46 Using the task-2 performance distribution five more women and five fewer men should enter the tournament. 
47 We calculate the difference between expected and actual gender gaps in AA tournament entry decision for 
1,000,000 simulations where we draw the 42 women and 42 men with replacement (using thresholds implied by 
Table V). The reported p-value is the percentage of strictly positive differences.    19
of winning each tournament. Panel B shows the corresponding figure for women. Both figures 
use performance prior to the entry decision (i.e., task 2) to determine the probability of 
winning, the figures are similar if we instead use ex-post performance (i.e., task 3 and 4). If 
changes in tournament entry were solely driven by changes in the probability of winning, then 
the two propensities to compete should coincide for the standard and AA tournaments. 
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  Panel  (A)          Panel  (B) 
FIGURE II: Proportion of participants entering the standard or the AA tournament conditional 
on probability of winning the tournament given ex-ante performance (task 2).
48 
 
Figure II shows that affirmative action reduces tournament entry by men beyond what is 
warranted by changes in the probability of winning the tournament. The overreaction by 
women appears even greater, as they are much more likely to compete under affirmative 
action. This finding is confirmed by a probit regression of the decision to enter a tournament 
on the probability of winning as well as an affirmative-action dummy (Table VI). For each 
individual we use both the decision to enter the task-3 tournament, and the decision to enter the 
task-4 AA tournament. We condition the tournament-entry decision on the probability 
associated with winning the tournament in question and cluster on the participant to account 
for the lack of independence between the two individual observations. If entry decisions by 
women and men depend solely on the probability of winning the tournament, then the marginal 
coefficient on the affirmative action dummy (AA) should be zero. Consistent with Figure II we 
                                                 
48 The bin size was chosen to secure similar numbers of participants in each bin. The number of individuals in 
each bin is as follows: In panel A, in the standard tournament there are 13, 8, 8, and 13, in each of the four bins 
with 13 in 0-0.05. In the AA tournament there are 13, 13, 7, and 9. In panel B, in the standard there are 15, 15, 6, 
and 6, and in AA there are 11, 14, 9, and 8.   20
see that the effect of affirmative action on entry is negative for men, and positive for women.
49 
Similarly, as seen by the significant female and affirmative-action interaction in the pooled 
regression, changes in the probability of winning do not fully account for the change in the 
gender gap under affirmative action.  
 
TABLE VI  
PROBIT OF TOURNAMENT CHOICE 
  Task 2 Performance 
 Men  Women  All 
Female     -0.37 
     (0.00) 
Female*AA     0.26 
     (0.00) 
AA -0.29  0.51  -0.27 
 (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Prob. of Winning  0.90  0.28  0.64 
 (0.00)  (0.28)  (0.00) 
Change in Prob. of Winning Tour. to PR  -0.35  0.30  -0.09 
 (0.22)  (0.25)  (0.61) 
Observations 84  84  168 
The table presents marginal effects evaluated at an individual (a man in the last column) in the standard 
tournament, with a probability of winning of 0.33 and a change in the probability of winning of 0.16. We cluster 
on participant to account for there being 2 observations for each of the 84 participants. p-values are in parenthesis. 
 
V.B. Do Beliefs Explain Changes in Tournament Entry under AA? 
In the standard tournament we found that conditional on optimal guessed rank, men were 
significantly more optimistic about their relative performance than women, and this difference 
helped explain the gender gap in tournament entry. If participants’ beliefs on winning are 
similar in the AA and standard tournament then it is unlikely that beliefs will help explain the 
response to affirmative action.  
We first analyze beliefs on within-gender rankings in task-2. For women and men we 
calculate the guess which would be money-maximizing given individual performance. Neither 
                                                 
49 The result is the same if we condition on the probability of winning after the entry decision, i.e., on task 3 and 4. 
Both women and men improve their performance from task2 to task 4, however there is no gender difference in 
the improvement (p = 0.95). The improvements in performance are 0.62 for women and 0.83 for men (matched 
pair signrank tests p = 0.04 and 0.05 respectively). The improvement in performance does not vary by task-4 
choice (p = 0.91 if enter, p = 0.36 if piece rate), nor is there a difference when conditioning on gender and task-4 
choice (p ≥ 0.35). The improvement in performance is primarily driven by an increase in performance between 
task 2 and 3. The improvement between task 3 and 4 is not significant and equals 0.12 for women and 0.14 for 
men (matched pair signrank test yields p = 0.79 and 0.97, respectively). Neither men nor women who enter the 
tournament have a significantly different improvement in performance in task 4 relative to task 3 (p ≥ 0.14).   21
women nor men seem overconfident. The distributions of guessed ranks within gender are not 
significantly different from actual or optimal guessed rank (p = 0.60 and p = 0.21 for women, 
and p = 0.45 and p = 0.45 for men, respectively).
50 Ordered probit regressions confirm that the 
guessed ranks within gender are correlated with optimal guesses, and that there is no gender 
difference in beliefs on relative tournament performance within one’s gender. That is, women 
seem as confident in their relative performance among women, as men do among men.
51  
While men are significantly more confident than women when assessing relative ability 
in a mixed-gender group, there is no gender difference within gender. Figure III shows for each 
optimal guessed rank the average guessed rank of women and men. Panel A shows the 
rankings among all 6 participants, while Panel B shows rankings within one’s gender. 
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Figure III: Average guessed rank as a function of optimal tournament rank in the whole 
group of 6 participants (A), and among group members of one’s gender (B). 
 
To evaluate the impact of beliefs on the more gender-specific AA tournament, we 
construct participants’ beliefs on whether they would have won the task-2 tournament under 
AA rules (GuessAAWin). Recall that a woman wins the AA tournament if she is either the 
best performing woman or among the two best performing participants in the group. A man, on 
the other hand, wins the AA tournament if he is both the best performing man and among the 
                                                 
50 The actual rank corresponds to the highest actual rank possible in case of ties The distributions of optimal and 
actual rank within gender do not differ (p = 0.74 for men and p = 1.0 for women). 
51 An ordered probit regression of guessed rank on optimal rank within gender yields coefficients for men of 0.99 
(p < 0.01), and 0.46 (p = 0.04) for women. Pooling all 42 women and 42 men yields coefficients of -0.04 on a 
female dummy (p = 0.87), and 0.70 on optimal rank (p < 0.01).   22
top two performers overall. We compare GuessAAWin both to the actual outcomes as well as 
to the belief on winning that is consistent with the participant’s optimal guessed rank. We refer 
to this measure as OptimalGuessAAWin. Similar to our guessed-rank results within gender, for 
GuessAAWin we find that neither women nor men are overconfident.
52 Furthermore, we find 
no gender differences in GuessAAWin when conditioning on OptimalGuessAAWin.
53 This 
result contrasts that of the standard tournament where conditional on OptimalGuessWin, men 
are significantly more likely than women to believe that they will win. As expected we find 
that relative to the standard tournament fewer men think that they will win the AA tournament, 
whereas more women think they will win the AA tournament. Note however that this change is 
only significant for men.
54  
To determine the impact of beliefs on changes in tournament entry under affirmative 
action we condition on the guess-win measures, see Table VII. The advantage of using the 
GuessWin measures is that it incorporates the differences between the standard and AA 
tournament, and accounts for the gender specific incentives. Controlling for performance we 
see in the first four columns that individuals who have beliefs consistent with winning are 
more likely to enter the tournament, however in a two-sided test this effect is only significant 
for women. Nonetheless, as seen by the coefficient on the AA dummy, for both men and 
women, including beliefs on winning reduces the change in the propensity to enter a 
tournament with affirmative action by about 20 percent. 
 
                                                 
52 On average the guessed AA win is not significantly different from actual AA win (p = 0.50 for men, and p = 
0.51 for women), or the optimal guess AA win (p = 1.0 for men and p = 0.49 for women).  
53 A probit regression of guess AA win for the 84 participants delivers the following marginal effects evaluated at 
a man with an optimal guess of winning: 0.08 on female (p = 0.43); 0.40 on optimal guess AA win (p < 0.01). 
Examining men and women separately yields coefficients on optimal guess AA win of 0.53 (p < 0.01) for men, 
0.27 (p = 0.12) for women. Furthermore, there are no significant gender differences in distributions of optimal 
guesses (p = 1.0), actual chances of winning (p = 0.65), nor guessed AA win (p = 0.66). 
54 In the standard tournament 30 men (70%) guess they win the tournament, compared to 17 (40.5%) in the AA 
tournament. The numbers for women are 15 (35.7%) in the standard and 20 (47.6%) in the AA tournament. The 
marginal effects of a clustered probit regression of GuessWin (standard or AA) evaluated for someone in the 
standard tournament who should optimally guess they win are for men: 0.40 (p < 0.01) on optimal guess and -0.15 
(p < 0.01) on AA dummy. For women the coefficients are 0.36 (p = 0.03) and 0.08 (p = 0.10) respectively. A 
pooled regression shows a significant gender difference in the response to affirmative action, the marginal 
coefficient on a female and AA interaction is 0.06 (p = 0.00), when controlling for optimal guesses, AA and 
female, and evaluating coefficients at a man in the standard tournament whose optimal belief is to win.   23
TABLE VII 
PROBIT OF TOURNAMENT CHOICE 
 Men  Men  Women Women All  All 
Female         -0.37  -0.29 
         (0.00) (0.01) 
Female*AA         0.26  0.18 
         (0.00) (0.00) 
AA -0.29  -0.23  0.51  0.40  -0.27  -0.18 
 (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.07) 
Prob. Of Winning  0.90  0.70  0.28  0.06  0.64  0.40 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.28)  (0.83)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Change Prob. Winning  -0.35  -0.38  0.30  0.23  -0.09  -0.15 
Tour. To PR  (0.22)  (0.15)  (0.25)  (0.41)  (0.61)  (0.31) 
GuessWin   0.19    0.38    0.27 
   (0.16)    (0.00)    (0.00) 
Observations 84  84  84  84  168  168 
The table presents marginal effects evaluated at an individual (a man in the last two columns), in the standard 
tournament, with a 0.33 percent probability of winning and a change in the probability of winning of 0.16, with a 
guess of winning (in columns 2, 4, and 6). We cluster on the participant to account for there being 2 observations 
for each of the 84 participants. p-values are in parenthesis. 
 
GuessWin is also significant in the pooled regression. Thus the change in the gender gap is in 
part explained by men being overconfident about their relative performance in mixed-gender 
groups, and less so in more gender-specific groups. However controlling for beliefs the 
coefficient on the female and affirmative-action interaction remains significant, indicating that 
changes in the gender gap in tournament entry under affirmative action is not fully explained. 
  
V.C. Effects of Submitting the Piece-Rate Results 
Next we examine the decisions to submit the piece rate to a standard or AA tournament. This 
analysis helps determine whether merely mentioning affirmative action influences behavior, 
and whether the response to affirmative action may result from the AA tournament requiring 
performance in a more gender-specific competition.  
We first compare the decisions to submit the piece rate to the standard versus the AA 
tournament (task 5 vs. 6). Affirmative action will affect the decision to submit the piece rate 
through changes in the probability of winning, differences in beliefs between mixed- versus 
single-gender groups, and the effect of mentioning affirmative action. The probit regression in 
table VIII shows that controlling both for beliefs and the probability of winning, the 
introduction of affirmative action does not cause men to change their decision to submit a 
piece-rate result to a tournament, the coefficient on the AA dummy is very small and at best   24
marginally significant. Women on the other hand are 28 percentage points more likely to 
submit their piece-rate performance when we introduce affirmative action. In the pooled 
analysis, the coefficient on the female and affirmative-action interaction is significant, 
demonstrating that the gender gap in submitting the piece rate differs significantly between the 
standard and AA tournament. These findings suggest that while simply mentioning affirmative 
action does not affect men, it does affect women. 
  
TABLE VIII 
PROBIT OF SUBMITTING THE PIECE RATE 
 Men  Women All 
Female     -0.17 
     (0.11) 
Female*AA     0.10 
     (0.00) 
AA -0.04  0.28  -0.06 
 (0.12)  (0.00)  (0.17) 
Prob. of Winning 0.04  0.35  0.17 
 (0.52)  (0.096)  (0.06) 
GuessWin 0.83  0.55  0.72 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Observations 84  84  168 
The marginal effects are evaluated at an individual (a man in the last column), in the standard tournament, with a 
probability of winning of 0.33, with a guess of winning. We cluster on the participant to account for there being 2 
observations for each of the 84 participants. p-values are in parenthesis. 
 
  Although the decisions to submit the piece rate and entering the tournament are very 
similar the difference between them is that in the first case a tournament choice does not result 
in a subsequent competitive performance. Thus the effect of affirmative action observed 
between task 5 and 6 cannot be driven by participants having different attitudes toward 
competing in groups where members of the opposite gender are more poorly represented. That 
is, in contrast to the difference between task 3 and 4, changes in compensation choices between 
task 5 and 6 cannot be explained by say women being more eager to compete in single- rather 
than mixed-gender groups. To determine whether the effect of affirmative action in part is 
explained by the competition being more gender specific, we use the task 5 and 6 decisions as 
controls in the task 3 and 4 decisions.  
Table IX examines changes in the decision to enter a tournament under affirmative 
action, when we control for the probability of winning, beliefs, and the decision to submit the 
piece-rate to a tournament. Conditioning on these factors affirmative action decreases the   25
probability that a man enters a tournament by 9 percentage points. This remaining effect may 
represent the reduction in the thrill of competing against a group with greater male 
representation. For women, the remaining effect of affirmative action is a 25 percentage point 
increase in tournament entry. Pooling men and women we see that the decision to submit the 
piece rate to the AA tournament helps explain the change in the gender gap, however the 
female and affirmative action interaction remains significant. Thus the gender gap in 
tournament entry differs significantly between the AA and standard tournament.
55 We ascribe 
this remaining difference to the competition being more gender specific under affirmative 
action. Men may feel more pressure to compete when the fraction of male competitors 
increase, whereas the fear of competing may diminish when women are in all female groups. 
 
TABLE IX 
PROBIT OF TOURNAMENT CHOICE 
 Men  Men  Men  Women Women Women  All  All  All 
Female            -0.37  -0.29  -0.18 
           (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Female*AA            0.26  0.18  0.07 
           (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
AA  -0.29  -0.23  -0.09  0.51 0.40 0.25 -0.27  -0.18  -0.09 
  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.09)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.11) 
Prob. Of Winning  0.90  0.70  0.19  0.28  0.06  -0.09  0.64  0.40  0.13 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.28) (0.83) (0.71) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) 
Change Prob. Winning  -0.35  -0.38  0.01  0.30  0.23  0.43  -0.09  -0.15  0.06 
Tour.  To  PR  (0.22)  (0.15)  (0.92)  (0.25) (0.41) (0.11) (0.61) (0.31) (0.42) 
GuessWin    0.19  0.05   0.38  0.35  0.27  0.12 
    (0.16)  (0.39)   (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.02) 
Submit Piece Rate      0.30      0.29      0.24 
      (0.00)     (0.07)     (0.00) 
Observations  84  84  84  84 84 84  168  168  168 
The marginal effects are evaluated at an individual (a man in the last three columns), in the standard tournament, with a 
probability of winning of 0.33 and a change in the probability of winning of 0.16, who submitted the piece rate performance to 
the tournament (columns 3, 6, and 9) with a guess of winning (columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, and 9). We cluster on the participant to 
account for there being 2 observations for each of the 84 participants. p-values are in parenthesis. 
 
                                                 
55 The coefficient on the female-affirmative action interaction does not capture the change in the gender gap 
between the standard and AA tournament. The change in the gender gap is given by [Pr(AA=1, F=1, AA·F=1;X) - 
Pr(AA=1, F=0, AA·F=0;X)] – [Pr(AA=0, F=1, AA·F=0;X) - Pr(AA=0, F=0, AA·F=0;X)]. Conditioning only on 
the probability of winning the change in the gap equals 0.76. The additional controls for beliefs and the decision 
to submit the piece rate reduces the gap to 0.31, thus 41 percent of the change in the gap is not accounted for.   26
VI: HOW COSTLY IS AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
The primary objective of affirmative action is to secure that a more diverse pool of applicants 
be selected as winners. The question of interest is how costly an improvement in diversity may 
be. To evaluate the cost of affirmative action we start by examining the consequences on 
earnings for the participants themselves. Since tournament entry is not payoff maximizing it is 
not obvious who will and will not benefit from the requirement that women be at least equally 
represented. We proceed by examining the effect affirmative action has on equity and on the 
performance of the selected participants. Specifically we ask how much lower the performance 
requirement will have to be for women, how many better performing men will have to be 
passed by to secure equal representation, and in particular the extent to which affirmative 
action will result in reverse discrimination. To answer these questions we will pay particular 
attention to the effect affirmative action has on the quality and gender composition of the pool 
of entrants.  
 
VI.A. Consequences for Participants 
Affirmative action affects individual payoffs through both institutional and behavioral changes, 
that is, payoffs are influenced both by changes in the probability of winning and the resulting 
changes in tournament entry. To decompose these two effects we compare the participant’s 
expected earnings in the standard and AA tournament, as well as the earnings participants 
would have made had they been subjected to the change in the probability of winning but not 
changed their tournament-entry decisions. That is, we determine the expected earnings that 
would result had individuals stuck by their standard-tournament entry decisions (task 3) and 
been given the affirmative action probability of winning (task 4). The three expected payoff 
measures are reported by gender in Table VII. As anticipated, affirmative action increases the 
expected payoffs for women, while decreasing it for men. For women affirmative action 
increases earnings from 6.8 to 8.4. However had their entry decisions into the AA tournament 
been as those in the standard tournament, then the change in the probability of winning alone 
would result in expected payoffs of 7.5. Thus 45 percent of the increase in payoffs to women is 
accounted for by changes in the probability of winning, while the remainder results from 
changes in their tournament entry. By comparison the decrease in payoffs of men, from 13.4 to 
10.0, is primarily caused by changes in the probability of winning. Changes in the probability   27
of winning alone decrease payoffs to 10.5, thus accounting for 85 percent of the decrease. A 
similar pattern is seen for the subgroup of participants who have higher expected earnings from 
entering the AA tournament. Women in this group can attribute 75 percent of the increase in 
payoffs to behavioral changes, while 70 percent of the decrease in payoffs for men is due to 
changes in the probability of wining. Finally, men and women who in expectation are better off 
not entering the AA tournament are slightly worse off under affirmative action. For women 
this decrease in payoffs is driven by them making inferior tournament-entry decision under 
affirmative action, whereas the behavior of men improves their earnings. 
 
TABLE X 
EXPECTED PAYOFFS 
Participants  Prob. of winning Entry  decision  Men  Women 
All       
  Standard Standard 13.4  6.8 
 AA  Standard  10.5  7.5 
  AA AA 10.0  8.4 
w/ positive exp. earnings from AA entry     
  Standard Standard 27.1  10.8 
 AA  Standard  21.4  12.2 
  AA AA 18.9  16.5 
w/ negative exp. earnings from AA entry     
  Standard Standard 5.0  4.0 
 AA  Standard  3.7  4.3 
  AA AA 4.5  2.9 
 
VI.B. Consequences for Performance and Equity 
While it is clear that affirmative action by mere design results in greater diversity among the 
winners, it is less clear how costly it will be for a firm to achieve this goal, nor is it clear how 
inequitable the resulting outcome may be. If we view those who enter competitions as 
applicants for jobs, and winners of the competition as those hired by the firm, then the costs of 
affirmative action depend critically on how many better performing men a firm will have to 
pass by to secure that women at least be equally represented. Passing by better performing 
candidates will not only be inequitable, but also impose a cost on firms who no longer are able 
to hire the best available candidates. To demonstrate these costs we examine the effect 
affirmative action has on the performance threshold applicants have to reach to get hired by the 
firm. Suppose a firm wants to hire say 20 applicants, then we ask what the minimum   28
performance threshold will be for applicants to be selected when equal representation of 
women is or is not required. Crucial for determining these performance costs is the gender and 
performance of those who enter the competition. Given changes in tournament entry there is 
reason to believe that the anticipated performance costs calculated before the introduction of 
affirmative action may differ substantially from those actually experienced.  
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                                                        Figure IV: Tournament Entry 
 
To assess the performance costs associated with fulfilling the affirmative-action 
requirement, we focus on the actual performances after the compensation choice. Since the 
performance in task 4 is slightly higher than in task 3, we rely on the task-3 performance.
56 We 
start by examining how changes in tournament entry under affirmative action affect the 
performance distributions of the pool of entrants. Figure IV Panel A shows the proportion of 
people with a given task-3 performance who choose to enter the standard or AA tournament. 
We see that affirmative action primarily increases entry for those who solve less than 14 
problems, whereas there is little or no effect on entry for those with a performance of 14 
problems or more.
57 This finding is confirmed by Panel B, which shows the number of entrants 
who have performances at or above a certain level. While the pool of entrants with a minimum 
                                                 
56 The results are similar when we use performances in task 2 or 4, or if we use performance in task-3 for entrants 
in the standard tournament and in task-4 for entrants in the AA tournament. Given the higher task-4 performance 
this later comparison would bias the results in favor of affirmative action. 
57 Less than ten percent of participants solve more than 20 problems, thus we focus the analysis on groups with 
minimum performances of 20 and below. 
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performance below 14 is greater under affirmative action, there is no change in the number of 
entrants who have a minimum performance between 14 and 20. 
Affirmative action changes both the performance distribution and the gender 
composition of the pool of entrants. Figure V panel A shows the proportion of women among 
entrants whose performance is at or above a specified performance level. While the number of 
high-performing entrants is similar in the standard and AA tournament, the proportion of these 
entrants who are female is very different. For example, of the entrants in the standard 
tournament with a performance of 15 and higher only 26 percent are women, in contrast in the 
AA tournament 50 percent of these entrants are women. This difference in gender composition 
implies that when choosing participants with a performance of 15 and higher it will be costly to 
fulfill the affirmative action requirement among entrants in the standard tournament, but not 
when choosing among entrants in the AA tournament. Note that the same holds for entrants 
with a performance of 16 or lower, while there is never an equal representation of women in 
the standard tournament, at least 50 percent of these entrants are women in the AA tournament. 
That is, ex-post the affirmative action requirement will not imply that more qualified men will 
have to give way to less qualified women. 
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Figure V: Performance of Entrants         
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Figure V Panel B demonstrates the performance costs of affirmative action, when choosing 
among entrants in the standard tournament (task-3) and in the AA tournament (task-4).  For 
each performance, say 15, panel B shows the number of entrants in the task-3 standard 
tournament (CH) whose task-3 performance is 15 or higher, and similarly the number of 
entrants in the task-4 AA tournament (AA) with a task-3 performance at or above this level. 
Thus the CH and AA lines are identical to those of Panel B of Figure IV. In addition we also 
show the number of people who can be hired among the entrants satisfying a given minimum 
performance requirement, when there must be at least one woman for every man hired. For 
entrants in task 3 this is shown by the CH w AA line. Given the few high-performing women 
who enter the standard tournament, the enforcement of affirmative action implies that very few 
participants of a given minimum performance can be hired among entrants in the standard 
tournament. For example, for performances above 15, there are 23 entrants in the standard 
tournament and 22 in the AA tournament. However, when we require that for every man one 
woman has to be selected, then only 12 people can be hired among the standard entrants (in the 
standard tournament there are only six female entrants with a performance of 15 and higher). 
In contrast, all 22 entrants can be hired in the AA tournament (11 women have a performance 
of 15 and higher). Furthermore, to hire another pair of entrants in the standard tournament 
under the affirmative action rule, one has to lower the minimum performance requirement to 
12 to add a woman, while passing by an additional 8 men with a higher performance. Using 
instead entrants in the AA tournament the same requirement implies that no men of higher 
performance are passed by to hire an additional woman. If we were to hire 22 entrants in the 
standard tournament and fulfill the affirmative action requirement, then we would have to 
lower the minimum acceptable performance threshold from 15 to 10.  
While affirmative action in the standard tournament implies that many more qualified 
men will be passed by to secure equal representation of women, such inequity does not arise 
once affirmative action is introduced and the minimum requirement for performance is 16 or 
less. This effect on reverse discrimination is further demonstrated in Figure VI, which shows 
for each minimum performance level the number of better performing men that must be passed 
by to secure that women be equally represented among those hired.  The number of men 
affected by reverse discrimination is demonstrated by CH w AA when relying on entry in the 
standard tournament, and by AA w AA when relying on entry in the AA tournament.   31
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Figure VI: Number of better performing men passed by to secure equal representation of 
women given entry before AA (CH w AA) vs. after AA (AA w AA) 
 
Based on tournament entry prior to the introduction of affirmative action we anticipate 
substantial reverse discrimination. For example, returning to the case with a minimum 
performance requirement of 15. We saw above that entry in the standard tournament would 
enable us to hire 12 people under the affirmative action requirement. As shown by the CH w 
AA line in Figure VI this implies that we would be passing by 6 men who have performances 
in excess of the required minimum for women.  The introduction of affirmative action however 
cause women to be better represented among the set of applicants, and we would instead be 
able to hire an equally representative pool of 22 people with a minimum performance of 15. As 
demonstrated by Figure VI, entry in the AA tournament implies that the requirement of equal 
representation does not cause better performing men to be passed by. Thus accounting for the 
changes in tournament entry the experienced degree of reverse discrimination is much smaller 
than anticipated.   
  The substantial difference between ex-post and ex-ante costs of affirmative action 
implies that it may be very expensive, in terms of performance loss and reverse discrimination, 
to apply the affirmative action rule ‘secretly’ or to introduce affirmative action after the 
participants have decided to enter a standard tournament. Furthermore, perceived inequity and 
performance costs may be vastly overestimated, if we fail to take into account that the pool of 
entrants will change along with a well-announced introduction of affirmative action. As many 
more women, and in particular many high-performing women, select to enter the AA 
tournament the gender composition of tournament entrants is very different under affirmative   32
action. These changes in the entry pool imply that there are circumstances where it need not be 
costly to secure a more diverse set of winners, certainly it may be much cheaper than suggested 
by the pool of entrants into a standard tournament. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper contributes to the literature that tries to understand why women are 
underrepresented in many high-profile jobs and across whole professions. While 
discrimination and gender differences in preferences and ability help explain this gender gap, 
another explanation may be that men and women respond differently to competitive 
environments (see Gneezy and Rustichini, 2005, Gupta, Poulsen and Villeval, 2005, and 
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Our study examines how and at what cost one can alter the 
institution used to select winners to entice more women to compete. Specifically, we 
investigate a quota-like affirmative action environment where we require that women be at 
least equally represented among those hired. Our analysis provides a deeper understanding of 
why women shy away from competition, and helps us understand which mechanisms we may 
use to change this behavior. Furthermore, we are able to examine the performance costs and 
reverse discrimination that may be associated with such an institutional change. 
While affirmative action is expected to affect tournament entry through changes in the 
probability of winning, other factors could influence entry. Decisions may change because we 
mention affirmative action, and because the competition becomes more gender specific (e.g., a 
woman wins as long as she is the best performing woman). A more gender-specific 
competition can affect tournament entry by reducing gender differences in beliefs about 
relative performance, as well as gender differences in the willingness to compete.  
We find that affirmative action causes a large increase in the tournament entry by 
women and a decrease in the entry by men. This change in behavior is not fully accounted for 
by changes in the probability in winning, rather the factors listed above all help explain why 
the gender gap in tournament entry differs under affirmative action.   
  Our experimental design allows us to characterize how the composition of the applicant 
pool changes with affirmative action. Replicating the finding that women shy away from 
competition, we find that prior to affirmative action only few high-performing women choose   33
to compete. As a result, only rarely does a woman succeed in winning the tournament.
58 Using 
this initial applicant pool the requirement that at least one woman must be hired for every man 
implies that very few participants can be hired when a specific minimum standard of 
performance has to be reached. This implies that to hire the same number of people the 
minimum performance standard has to be lowered substantially. Based on entry in the standard 
tournament the under representation of women causes affirmative action to be very costly as 
many more qualified men would have to be passed by to secure equal representation of 
women. The expected costs of affirmative action would still be substantial if the response to 
the institutional change only results from changes in the probability of winning. However, as 
mentioned above, we show that the introduction of affirmative action causes a response which 
is greater than that predicted by the probability of winning alone. While some high-performing 
men drop out of the competition, many women come in, and the overall number of high-
performing participants in the entry pool is barely affected. This change in the gender 
composition of the applicant pool causes the ex post performance costs of affirmative action to 
be substantially smaller than those predicted ex ante.  
Research on affirmative action has primarily focused on examining the consequences 
of changing the demand side of the market (see e.g. Coate and Loury, 1993, Fryer and Loury, 
2005, and Holzer and Neumark, 2000, for an overview). That is, the focus has been on 
determining the consequences for diversity, performance, and reverse discrimination of 
altering the rules for admission and hiring. We show that in assessing the costs of affirmative 
action we need to also account for the indirect effects that occur through self selection into 
competitions.
59 Specifically, we demonstrate that the effects of affirmative action on the set of 
applicants may be very large when entry decisions are not payoff maximizing. If we do not 
account for such changes in behavior we will exaggerate the costs of affirmative action.  
 
                                                 
58Note that this gender difference arises in the absence of any discrimination. 
59 While most affirmative action studies examine the direct effect on those admitted under the program, a few 
studies also account for the indirect effects on applicants. Long (2004) and Card and Krueger (2004) examine how 
the elimination of affirmative action in California and Texas influenced college applications.  Long (2004) finds 
that fewer minority students send their SAT scores to top tier colleges, while Card and Krueger (2005) show that 
the policy does not influence the decisions of highly qualified minorities.  Since the UC and UT systems rely on 
percentage rules whereby the top 4 vs. 10 percent of any graduating high school class are guaranteed admission, 
these analyses unfortunately do not enable us to determine if absent such programs we may observe ‘sub-optimal’ 
application decisions from highly qualified applicants.   34
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INSTRUCTIONS 
WELCOME 
In the experiment today you will be asked to complete six different tasks. None of these will 
take more than 5 minutes. At the end of the experiment you will receive $5 for having 
completed the experiment. In addition, we will randomly select one of the tasks and pay you 
based on your performance in that task. Once you have completed the six tasks we determine 
which task counts for payment by drawing a number between 1 and 6. The method we use to 
determine your earnings varies across tasks. Before each task we will describe in detail how 
your payment is determined. 
 
Your total earnings from the experiment are the sum of your payment for the randomly 
selected task, your $5 payment for completing the experiment, and a $10 show up fee. At the 
end of the experiment you will be asked to come to the side room where you will be paid in 
private.  
 
Task 1 – Piece Rate 
 
For Task 1 you will be asked to calculate the sum of five randomly chosen two-digit numbers. 
You will be given 5 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a series of these problems. You 
cannot use a calculator to determine this sum, however you are welcome to write the numbers 
down and make use of the provided scratch paper. You submit an answer by clicking the 
submit button with your mouse. When you enter an answer the computer will immediately tell 
you whether your answer is correct or not. Your answers to the problems are anonymous.  
 
If Task 1 is the one randomly selected for payment, then you get 50 cents per problem you 
solve correctly in the 5 minutes. Your payment does not decrease if you provide an incorrect 
answer to a problem. We refer to this payment as the piece rate payment.  
 
Please do not talk with one another for the duration of the experiment. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand. 
 
 
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN? 
 
Task 2 – Tournament 
 
As in Task 1 you will be given 5 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a series of five 2 digit 
numbers. However for this task your payment depends on your performance relative to that of 
a group of other participants. Each group consists of six people, 3 men and 3 women. The five 
other members of your group are located in the same row as you, that is, you are paired with 
the people sitting in front of you and those sitting behind you. 
 
If Task 2 is the one randomly selected for payment, then your earnings depend on the number 
of problems you solve compared to the five other people in your group. The two individuals 
who correctly solve the largest number of problems will receive $1.5 per correct problem, 
while the other participants receive no payment. We refer to this as the tournament payment. If   38
there are ties the winner will be randomly determined. You will not be informed of how you 
did in the tournament until all six tasks have been completed.  
 
Please do not talk with one another. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
 
 
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN? 
 
Task 3 – Choice 
 
As in the previous two tasks you will be given 5 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a 
series of five 2-digit numbers. However, you now have to choose which payment scheme you 
want for your performance on the third task. You can either choose to be paid according to the 
piece rate, or according to the tournament.  
 
If Task 3 is the one randomly selected for payment, then your earnings for this task are 
determined as follows. If you choose piece rate you receive 50 cents per problem you solve 
correctly. If you choose tournament your performance will be evaluated relative to the 
performance of the other five participants of your group in the Task 2-tournament. Task 2-
tournament is the task you just completed. If you correctly solve more problems than 4 
participants did in the task 2-tournament, then you receive three times the payment from the 
piece rate, that is, $1.5 per correct problem. That is, at most only one participant in your group 
can have a higher task 2-tournament performance than your task-3 performance. Otherwise, 
you receive no earnings for this task. If there are ties, then the ranking is determined randomly. 
Remember, your group consists of all individuals that sit in the same row as yourself. Every 
group has 3 men and 3 women. You will not be informed of how you did in the tournament 
until all six tasks have been completed. 
 
The next computer screen will ask you to choose whether you want the piece rate or the 
tournament applied to your performance. You will then be given 5 minutes to calculate the 
correct sum of a series of five randomly chosen two-digit numbers.  
 
Please do not talk with one another. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
 
 
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN? 
 
Affirmative-Action Tournament 
 
Before we start the next task we explain the rules of an affirmative-action tournament. In an 
affirmative-action tournament the winners are determined as follows. One winner will be the 
best performing woman in a group. The other winner is the best performing individual among 
the rest of the group members (i.e., excluding the best performing woman). 
 
Let us look at a concrete example that illustrates how the winners in an affirmative-action 
tournament are determined. We order the group members within each gender according to their   39
performance such that w1 is the best performing woman, w2 is the second best performing 
woman, etc. We order the men in a similar manner, i.e., m1 is the best performing man, m2 is 
the second best performing man, etc. The best performing woman, w1, is always one of the 
two winners in the affirmative-action tournament. To determine the second winner we need to 
find out who is the best performing individual among the remaining members of the group 
(i.e., all group members excluding w1). Since there is going to be only one other winner it can 
only be w2 or m1. Thus, if the performance of w2 is higher than the performance of m1, then 
she is the second winner. If w2 performed worse than m1, then m1 is the second winner. 
  
To summarize a woman will win an affirmative-action tournament if she is the best performing 
woman or if she is among the two best performing individuals in the group. A man wins an 
affirmative-action tournament if he is the best performing man and if he is among the two best 
performing individuals in the group. Thus there is at least one woman and at most one man 
among the winners in an affirmative-action tournament. 
 
 
NEXT PAGE 
 
Task 4 – Choice II 
 
As in the previous three tasks you will be given 5 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a 
series of five 2-digit numbers. Again, you now have to choose which payment scheme you 
want for your performance on the fourth task. You can either choose to be paid according to 
the piece rate, or according to the affirmative-action tournament. 
 
If Task 4 is the one randomly selected for payment, then your earnings for this task are 
determined as follows. If you choose the piece rate you receive 50 cents per problem you solve 
correctly. If you choose the affirmative-action tournament your performance will be evaluated 
relative to the performance of other participants in your group in the Task 2-tournament. Task 
2-tournament is the second task you completed. The instructions for women are that you 
receive $1.5 per correct problem if (1) you correctly solve more problems than 4 participants 
did in the task 2-tournament, or (2) you correctly solve more problems than the other 2 women 
did in the task 2-tournament. Otherwise, you receive no earnings for this task. The instructions 
for men are that you receive $1.5 per correct problem if (1) you correctly solve more problems 
than 4 participants did in the task 2-tournament, and (2) you correctly solve more problems 
than the other 2 men did in the task 2-tournament. Otherwise, you receive no earnings for this 
task. For both, women and men, if there are ties, then the ranking is determined randomly. 
Remember, your group consists of all individuals that sit in the same row as yourself. Every 
group has 3 men and 3 women. You will not be informed of how you did in the tournament 
until all six tasks have been completed.  
 
The next computer screen will ask you to choose whether you want the piece rate or the 
affirmative-action tournament applied to your performance. You will then be given 5 minutes 
to calculate the correct sum of a series of five randomly chosen two-digit numbers.  
 
Please do not talk with one another. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.   40
 
 
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN? 
 
Task 5 – Submit Piece Rate  
 
You do not have to add any numbers for the fifth task of the experiment. Instead you may be 
paid one more time for the number of problems you solved in the Task 1. However, you now 
have to choose which payment scheme you want applied to the number of problems you solved 
in Task 1-Piece Rate. You can either choose to be paid according to the piece rate, or 
according to the tournament. 
 
If the fifth task is the one selected for payment, then your earnings for this task are determined 
as follows. If you choose the piece rate you receive 50 cents per problem you solved in Task 1. 
If you choose the tournament your performance will be evaluated relative to the performance 
of the other five participants of your group in the Task 1-piece rate. If you correctly solved 
more problems than 4 participants did in the task 1-piece rate, then you receive three times the 
payment from the piece rate, that is, $1.5 per correct problem. That is, at most only one 
participant in your group can have a higher task 1 performance than you. Otherwise, you 
receive no earnings for this task. If there are ties, then the ranking is determined randomly.  
 
Remember, your group consists of all individuals that sit in the same row as yourself. Every 
group has 3 men and 3 women. You will not be informed of how you did in the tournament 
until all six tasks have been completed. 
 
The next computer screen will tell you how many problems you correctly solved in Task 1, and 
will ask you to choose whether you want the piece rate or the tournament applied to your 
performance.  
 
Please do not talk with one another. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
 
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN? 
 
Task 6 – Submit Piece Rate II 
 
You do not have to add any numbers for the sixth and final task of the experiment. Instead you 
may be paid one more time for the number of problems you solved in the Task 1. However, 
you now have to choose which payment scheme you want applied to the number of problems 
you solved in Task 1. You can either choose to be paid according to the piece rate, or 
according to the affirmative-action tournament. 
 
If the sixth task is the one selected for payment, then your earnings for this task are determined 
as follows. If you choose the piece rate you receive 50 cents per problem you solved in Task 1. 
If you choose the affirmative-action tournament your performance will be evaluated relative to 
the performance of other participants in your group in Task 1-piece rate. The instructions for 
women are that you receive $1.5 per correct problem if (1) you correctly solved more problems   41
than 4 participants did in the task 1-piece rate, or (2) you correctly solved more problems than 
the other 2 women did in the task 1-piece rate. Otherwise, you receive no earnings for this task. 
The instructions for men are that you receive $1.5 per correct problem if (1) you correctly 
solved more problems than 4 participants did in the task 1-piece rate, and (2) you correctly 
solved more problems than the other 2 men did in the task 1-piece rate. Otherwise, you receive 
no earnings for this task. For both, women and men, if there are ties, then the ranking is 
determined randomly.  
 
Remember, your group consists of all individuals that sit in the same row as yourself. Every 
group has 3 men and 3 women. You will not be informed of how you did in the tournament 
until all six tasks have been completed.  
 
The next computer screen will tell you how many problems you correctly solved in Task 1, and 
will ask you to choose whether you want the piece rate or the tournament applied to your 
performance.  
 
Please do not talk with one another. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
 
 
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN? 
 
 
 
  
 